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Takings Law in Light of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council
Judith M. LaBelle*
As democracy swept throughout Eastern Europe, one

commentator struck a somber note: "Democracy has defeated
communism," he said. "Now the question will be whether democracy can survive capitalism."
That comment comes to mind during this discussion of
the takings issue because it is our strident strain of capitalism,
with its extreme emphasis on the individual and individual
rights and its characterization of land as just another form of
capital that gets in our way and clouds our vision, as we consider the degree to which government may rightfully regulate
the use of private land.
Given this capitalistic view of land, it should come as no
surprise that takings jurisprudence is in a muddle. Rather
than having an economy that serves the needs of a social and
political system, we seem increasingly to mold our political
and social systems to serve our economy. Yet our economic
theory discourages us from recognizing that we live in a world
of finite natural resources in which everything is intercon* Judith M. LaBelle is Corporate Counsel for the National Audubon Society and
a private consultant on land use and other environmental matters. In 1989, after having been a member of Berle, Kass & Case in New York City, she became Deputy
Director and Counsel for the New York State Commission on the Adirondacks in the
Twenty-First Century. In 1990, she became a Loeb Fellow in Advanced Environmental Studies at the Graduate School of Design of Harvard University.
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nected. When we do manage to incorporate our growing environmental knowledge into our thinking or governmental actions, the regulation which results is often undercut by courts
which place greater emphasis on individual economic expectations than on societal needs and expectations.
Therefore, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,1 I would like to step
back and consider various social and political contexts within
which takings cases arise and suggest some initiatives that
could have a positive impact on the more general issue of land
use and the jurisprudence that stems from its regulation.
For starters, our prevailing economic theory, which
deeply influences both political and judicial decisions, must be
revised and when so revised, applied. In a recent book entitled
For the Common Good,2 Herman Daly and John Cobb present
a cogent analysis of why economic theory fails to recognize the
environmental disaster it is creating. It is instructive to consider a few of the authors' major points.
To begin with, the prevailing paradigm of growth as the
only measure of economic health refuses to account for the
finite nature of the natural resources on which growth is
based. Daly and Cobb argue that this cannot be sustained,
that the system will undermine itself:
...The scale of human activity relative to the biosphere
has grown too large. In the past 36 years (1950-86) population has doubled (from 2.5 to 5 billion). Over the same
period, gross world product and fossil fuel consumption
have each roughly quadrupled. Further growth beyond
the present scale is overwhelmingly likely to increase
costs more rapidly than it increases benefits, thus ushering in a new era of 'uneconomic growth' that impoverishes
rather than enriches. This is the fundamental wild fact
that so far has not found expression in words sufficiently
feral to assault successfully the civil stupor of economic
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), rev'g and remanding 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
2. HERMAN E. DALY, & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING
THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE

FUTURE

(1989).
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discourse.8

Lest the stridency of these words leads you to discount
them, note that Daly is a senior economist at the World Bank
and Cobb is professor of philosophy and theology at the
School of Theology at Claremont.
This is a primary point of their critique - that prevailing
theory fails to recognize that the economy has a proper scale
relative to the ecosystem. As the economy grows (whether
through increases in population or consumption rates), it may
demand resources in excess of the ecosystem's ability to renew
them. Although the world economy gets bigger, the ecosystem
in which it operates does not. There are limits to how much
we can change our ecosystem and limits to how much we can
take from it and discharge into it without undermining its capacity to cleanse the air, purify the water and maintain a stable climate.
Moreover, as a result of focusing on markets and market
pricing mechanisms, the prevailing economic theory does not
account for the environmental costs of economic growth they become externalities, external to the market-based theory, but increasingly real to those who live with the results of
the system on which it is based. At one point, when the scale
of economic activity was such that the environment seemed to
absorb its impacts without anyone having to bear the cost,
this flaw in the theory might not have mattered. However, we
are now beginning to reach or exceed those limits. PCBs in
the Hudson River and dioxin in Lake Champlain are but two
examples of environmental externalities and the difficulties
they pose. In both instances, the true cost of PCBs and dioxin
and their effect on the environment were not priced by any
market. As a result, we now struggle to develop ways to restore the water quality and habitat they harmed, determine
responsibility and assess the potentially staggering cost of
remediation.
In addition, prevailing economic theory has such a strong
focus on short-term return of capital that it provides a ration3. Id.
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ale for depleting resources and harvesting species to extinction in an effort to obtain immediate economic gain rather
than focusing on husbanding them for long-term public and
private benefit. As Daly and Cobb put it, we generally treat
the earth as if it were "a business in liquidation."
Finally, although economists use the term "land" as an
inclusive term for the natural environment, their focus is
generally on land as just another form of capital or commodity to be owned and exploited. Because economists frequently
ignore ecological systems, their consideration stops at the
boundary line, without regard for the impact that the use of
the resource will have on ecological systems or the human
community.
Consequently, our political discourse has gone awry in
part because the economic theory that we rely on to grapple
with real property issues is fundamentally flawed. The present
market oriented economic theory provides few solutions to the
real property issues which this nation faces. The importance
of the critique put forth by Daly and others - and their proposals for revising the way we calculate Gross National Product and other reforms - are gaining recognition, but have yet
to have a significant influence on American public policy.
Just as the economic view of land as merely another form
of capital fails, so does a legal theory that is based on that
view. To the extent that takings jurisprudence is based primarily on an economic view of land, it perpetuates, protects
and encourages unsustainable growth. The Lucas decision signals the willingness of an emerging majority of the Court to
substitute its judgment for that of legislatures which are becoming increasingly cognizant of the need to limit growth
based upon environmental principles. Furthermore, the
Court's decision reflects the principles espoused by the Chicago School of Economics, which seeks to protect and promote
land use theories based on a market economy. Given the trend
in the Court today, we are moving into an era of more frequent clashes over land use and its limitations.
A second initiative that would improve the way we manage land use is a more thoughtful approach to issues relating
to equity. It cannot be stated too often that the Lucas deci-
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sion relates to a very unusual situation (the existence of
which, in this case, Justice Souter found "highly questionable"4), one in which the owner is deprived of all economic use
(or "interest," using Justice Souter's terminology). And even
then, the Court continues to recognize that the state may impose its regulations without compensation if, in effect, its intent is to prevent a nuisance. Therefore, Lucas by itself does
not expand the situations in which the state must compensate
for regulations that impact value.
However, to say that the state is not constitutionally obligated to compensate an owner when a severely restrictive regulation has stopped just short of wiping out all use or value of
his property should not be the end of the discussion. If we
look up from our parsing of the case law and consider the real
world situations that generate the litigation in the first place,
we see several forces at work that suggest that we will all benefit if we address the issue of equity more directly.
First, litigation is expensive; society's resources could be
better used in other ways. Moreover, adjusting the balance between the individual and society is more appropriately done
by the legislature than the judiciary. Some takings litigation
might be avoided if fairness issues were discussed and addressed more creatively when the regulations are devised.
Second, we tend to rely too heavily on regulation to
achieve land use goals and fail to coordinate regulation with
economic incentives and with public and private initiatives
that seek the same end. We have a great deal to learn from
the British in this regard. They realized long ago that merely
precluding development would not preserve agricultural activity or the treasured pastoral countryside. Therefore, they provided a variety of carefully targeted subsidies to preserve key
elements of the countryside and initiated efforts to integrate
the various public and private efforts to promote appropriate
economic development. Fostering more efforts such as these
might take much of the sting out of stricter land use regulations in this country while making it more likely that our un4. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2925 (1992), rev'g
and remanding 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
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derlying objectives would be achieved.
Third, our sense of fairness is closely related to expectations. Often we decide what is fair by considering not only the
interests of each party (here, the individual and the state),
but also the reasonable expectations of each.
To a large extent, the economic expectations of landowners have been created by our society's tendency, mirrored
rather than tempered by the judiciary, to focus on individual
economic cost more closely than society's, and to regard land
as an economic rather than an ecological resource. Therefore,
there may be some situations in which the Constitution does
not compel compensation (or some variance from the strict
application of the regulation), but our sense of fairness requires compensation because the regulation is both unexpected and extreme in its impact. Given that our sense of fairness relates to expectations, this may be considered a
transitional problem; the next owner will take title with the
knowledge of the restrictions.
For example, many farmers are now reaching retirement
age and have come to perceive the development value of their
land as a retirement nest egg. The imposition of strict agricultural zoning may reduce the value of the land dramatically,
leaving the farmer with fewer, and perhaps inadequate, resources with which to face the rest of his life. This might be
an appropriate situation in which to consider whether some
form of compensation can be devised to reduce the impact on
this generation of farmers while still protecting the land base.
The next farmer will not have the same financial expectations - the transition will have been completed. However,
both the initial farmer and his successor may need new financial and other types of support for continuing the agricultural
operation, since farmers have increasingly come to rely on
their land as collateral for operating loans.
Our sense of fairness also relates to the nature of the parties. We may decide, for example, that the farmer's situation
is far different from that of the speculative developer who has
just bought the neighboring farm in the hopes of obtaining a
zoning change that would allow him to build a shopping
center. He assumed the risk relating to land value in a far
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different way than the lifelong farmer.
The equity issue was a central concern to the Commission
on the Adirondacks in the Twenty-First Century. I would like
to use the Commission's proposal, released in 1990, to illustrate how a variety of techniques can be woven together to
address this issue.
The Adirondack Park is one of the jewels of our nation,
with its unique mix of mountains, lakes and forests. It is not
the standard American "park" since its six million acres are a
patchwork of public and private land (split approximately 40/
60). Thus, what is done on the private land has a direct and
significant impact on the public land.
In 1988, about one-third of the entire Park was owned by
564 private landowners who each owned over 500 acres of
land. Just over half of this land was owned by the forest industry, which is also supported by many other private owners
who have traditionally managed their lands for timber
production.
As the Commission began its work, the trend toward the
fragmentation of this land base and its timber resource was
clear. For example, sales of subdivided property in the Park
tripled between 1982 and 1985; sales doubled again by 1988.
This continued fragmentation would not only have severe ecological consequences for the state-owned land in the Park
(known as the Forest Preserve) but would undermine the private Adirondack forests as a sustainable economic base for the
residents of the Park. The Adirondack Park Agency Act
would allow over 150,000 additional residences on the 2.7 million acres of mostly forested land classed as resource management and rural use. An additional quarter of a million new
residences could be built in the other areas of the Park.
The Commission proposed a variety of measures, including the reduction of both uses and density within the resource
management and rural use areas. These measures however did
not constitute a compensable taking. Nonetheless, because of
a concern for the equities involved, the Commission proposed
several measures to support the continuation of the timber
and agricultural industries and to provide limited development potential and economic return to each owner.
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Among the techniques included in the Commission's plan
for the resource management and rural use land were:
- The purchase of conservation easements to preclude
structural development, but wherever appropriate, allow
for continued sustainable timbering. (Since the State pays
taxes on its easement interests within the Park, the tax
payments to local governments would not be reduced.)
Coupling a reduction in density with a transferrable
development rights program.
- Every landowner would be entitled to have one
principal building (termed a "Structural Development Right" or "SDR").
- Large landowners would also retain one SDR for
each additional 2,000 acres of their holdings (related
to the smallest acreage considered capable of supporting an independent timbering operation in the
Adirondack forest). The SDR could be sold with a
much smaller parcel and the remaining land retained without the right for further structural development. (The Forest Use Tax Program, noted below,
would encourage its retention in active timber
production.)
- Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) would
be granted to each owner based on densities allowed
by the current Adirondack Park Agency (APA) Act.
These TDRs could be sold to the state at a statutory
price or sold on the private market for use, within
certain limits, within the moderate intensity and low
intensity use areas of the Park (areas previously
identified as being capable of sustaining further development), where allowable densities would be
increased.
- A Forest Use Tax Program that would reduce property
tax to a level reflecting value for timbering rather than
development would be open to owners of parcels larger
than 125 acres (a size below which it is likely that other
values supersede forest use values). In return for this tax
reduction, the owner would give the state an option to
buy the SDRs on the property at a fair market value determined by appraisal. The state would reimburse local
governments for the taxes not paid by owners enrolled in
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the program.
Changes in federal and state tax policy were to encourage the continuation of the forest products industry,
including preferential capital gains treatment for timber
taken from lands which are guaranteed to remain in timber production for at least twenty years, and current use
valuation for estate tax purposes of inherited forest land
if the new owner agrees to maintain the land in forest use
without structural development for at least twenty years.

The complexity of even this brief summary indicates how
difficult it is to develop measures to respond to owners' expectations while protecting natural resources. Even with this
plan, 10,000 to 15,000 new principal structures would be
added to the 14,000 existing structures on resource management and rural use areas. Nevertheless, this would substantially reduce the potential impact from the more than 150,000
structures allowed by the current regulations.
This plan has not been enacted; it was swamped politically and has not yet received fair consideration. But the fact
that it has been stalled does not undermine the importance of
the concepts it embodies. In fact, the Commission proposed
little that was new. If the techniques it incorporated seem unfamiliar to many New Yorkers, it is in part because we have
long since fallen behind in the land use arena.
We in New York State tend to think that we are in the
forefront of just about everything. But certainly in terms of
land use planning and regulations that protect resources and
provide greater predictability in the development process, we
lag far behind many other states that have moved to statewide planning and have recognized great benefit. For example,
the Oregon system establishes urban growth boundaries and
severely restricts land use in the countryside to protect agricultural uses. While the plan met with fierce opposition when
first adopted about twenty years ago, even some commercial
developers have since credited the growth boundary around
Portland for the city's continued economic vitality. Also, Vermont's Act 250 has been credited with having helped Vermont
avoid the real estate "bust" that has overwhelmed many of
the states that indulged in the development "boom" during
9
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the 1980's.
Moreover, a study concluded earlier this year by the
Center for Urban Policy Studies at Rutgers University found
that New Jersey's proposed growth management plan would
save the state billions of dollars, without impacting the number of people or jobs added to the state by directing growth to
areas where roads, sewers and schools already exist, rather
than allowing sprawl across the remaining open land.
A major argument in favor of state-wide planning is that
it brings a greater level of consistency and predictability to
the land development process - responding to both the developers' and communities' complaints that their expectations
are undercut by the present system. Better planning will
avoid bad situations as well as promote better solutions and
better overall use of resources. But to do so, it must incorporate the best available ecological thinking and must be allowed to evolve as our understanding of ecological systems
evolves. The planning structure must also be able to deal with
resources on the level at which they can be effectively managed. This will mean moving, when appropriate, from the
strong focus on local control that characterizes New York
State to more bioregional thinking and planning. Given the
degree to which decisions made at the federal and state level
impact local land use decisions, much of the thinking about
the strength of local control is mythical anyway.
Since relationships are at the heart of issues of equity and
fairness, the final initiative which must be addressed is the
relationship between individuals and their communities. The
property rights movement, which is fueling some of the current takings claims, may, in part, reflect the anti-institutional
strain of the legacy of the 1980's. During this period of great
economic activity, our political and economic institutions were
discredited among large segments of the populace. Many
Americans have come to think that they cannot influence the
businesses or governmental agencies that affect their lives.
Few of the corporations with which they deal are locally
owned or evidence long-term commitments to the communities within which they operate. Congress and the federal bureaucracy are perceived as being increasingly irrelevant when
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/5
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it comes to solving serious problems.
People are scared, angry and frustrated, and are taking a
stand in the only arena that seems to be left to them - the
use of their land. Not only is this consistent with our heritage,
but many see the exploitation of the value that has accrued in
their land as the only way to get a seat at the table in the
capitalist game. Indeed, when our economic and social fabric
is torn and our resources squandered by both public and private action and inaction, why should any individual be restrained? It is the tragedy of the commons writ large.
In A Sand County Almanac,5 Aldo Leopold suggests that
ethics develop in sequence, the first set involving relations between individuals, the second between individuals and society,
and the third between individuals and their environment. Leopold focused on the need to develop the third, his "land
ethic."
I suggest, however, that the current focus on the takings
issue and the assertion of private property rights reflect to
some degree the erosion of the first two sets of ethics; those
between individuals and those between the individual and society. We are quick to assert the primacy of our individual
rights - especially property rights - even when exercise of
those rights are seriously detrimental to our neighbors. While
we are quick to demand compensation for any diminution in
value suffered as the result of regulation, we ignore the increase in value that results from government actions. The focus on the individual isolated from society echoes the focus on
individual parcels of land isolated from ecological systems by
arbitrary boundary lines.
We have become so taken with the pursuit of individual
rights and personal economic gain that we have lost sight of
the community and the social fabric of mutuality and reciprocity without which our economic and political systems cannot operate. Participants on both sides of the issue are often
driven to extreme positions which do not foster civil discourse
or the creative resolution of the basic conflict.
5. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 202-

03 (1987).
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Thus, we return to the initial question - whether democracy can survive capitalism. The manner in which our takings
jurisprudence develops will shape the answer.
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